News from the Front - 19th May 2023
The weekly newsletter from from 1914-1918 - The First World War.
This week we look at from two angles at the subject of munitions production.
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One anniversary
The “shell crisis” breaks
On the 16th of May 1915, Colonel Repington of the The Times newspaper, published his first article about what was to become known as the “shell crisis”. In the article, he alleged that the offensive against the Aubers Ridge had been unable to achieve its full objectives due to a lack of artillery ammunition.
In the Battle of Aubers Ridge, launched on the 9th May, the plan called for the same pattern of bombardment used successfully at Neuve Chappelle; a short bombardment, focussed on German strongpoints, of around 30 minutes with concentrated fire for the final ten minutes before the assault went in. Douglas Haig, commanding the attack had been warned that the Germans had improved their defensive patterns since the earlier battle, but believed that the same pattern of attack would still work. This was a long-held belief; he had remarked to Repinton at the beginning of the year that, “as soon as we were supplied with ample artillery ammunition of high explosive, I thought we could walk through the German line at several places.”
The attack was not a success. The bombardment was simply not long enough or powerful enough to do the levels of damage that were expected and the “continuous waves of fresh troops” that were supposed to overwhelm the defences were not enough. The defensive improvements were sufficient to allow the Germans hold their lines in most instances and the results of the first day were poor, with 458 officers and 11,000 men being lost. Haig hoped to carry on the attack, but in the light of such stunning losses, was forced to stop the offensive.
In the aftermath of this failure, it seemed obvious that it could be attributed to lack of lack of artillery, and the quality of the artillery pieces themselves. On the left of the attack, the British experience contrasted strongly with that of the French on the right. The French had laid down a much longer and heavier bombardment and it seemed that this had helped them to achieve their immediate objectives. They had then pushed on towards the lower slopes of the ridge before halting to bring up reserves and re-organise.
Colonel Repinton, who was an approved war correspondent, spoke with Sir John French after the action. French had come to the conclusion that lack of artillery was the root cause. French had observed a small part of the action and was annoyed that he had just been ordered to send 20,000 shells to Gallipoli to help with the effort there; drawing conclusions from what he’d seen and venting his anger, he proceeded to give Repington quite an exclusive. French had previously complained about lack of munitions after the Battle of Neuve Chappelle, and on other occasions, but Kitchener had always reassured Prime Minister Asquith that the problems were not serious and were possible a case of French looking for a reason (that wasn’t his doing) why his offensives weren’t tactically successful. Asquith had taken Kitchener’s line and, just three weeks before the Aubers Ridge battle, had made a public speech denying that there were munitions shortages. This meant that Repington’s report rapidly became a political matter of the highest importance.
Repington’s story hit upon the truth that shell expenditure was very high, could be higher, and had been patchy on occasions. There was certainly truth to the story, as there had been supply problems. An example was given by a Bombardier W Kemp, an artillery man, recounted his experience during the run up to the battle, “Next week the Battery was turned out one night to unload ammunition. There was one wagon and when it was all unloaded there were ten rounds – and they were all armour-piercing shells from the coast defence batteries. That’s all they could give us. We didn’t find it reassuring. We thought it was a disgrace.”
In the face of Kitchener’s denial, French sent copies of his correspondence showing his requests for more ammunition to Lloyd George, who headed up the munitions committee, and to key members of the government’s parliamentary opposition. Asquith was torn between Britain’s most famous soldier, Lord Kitchener, and the news from France. He realised that part of the problem was that Kitchener was simply in charge of too much, being responsible for the entire military direction of the war, alongside the recruitment and training of the new armies, and many other responsibilities.
Of course, it wasn’t all Kitchener’s doing. Continued ideological debates around whether the pre-war system of government contracts to private companies or a nationalised munitions industry would be better hadn’t helped. The committee designed to look at munitions supply, headed by Lloyd George, had foundered earlier in the year when Kitchener, claiming he didn’t have the time, withdrew from their meetings. No one person had responsibility for production, and manpower was distributed according to a compromise that favoured incumbent suppliers in areas where they were established but offered contracts to new entrants where they were not. Supplies were ordered by a combination of the anticipated usage rates and the capacity of the industry, which tended to result in under-orders. The rapid expansion of the army was also under-counted and the contractors themselves under-delivered. All these factors contributed to a general position of under-supply and informal rationing.
Into these problems waded Repinton’s article that argued for more heavy artillery armed with more high explosive shells to smash down the parapets and destroy the wire that had had thwarted the Aubers Ridge attack. Picking up on the mood, other newspapers piled in, notably the Daily Mail with its article headlined “THE TRAGEDY OF THE SHELLS: LORD KITCHENER’S GRAVE ERROR”.
Asquith’s government was now in trouble, with Lloyd Geoge, who was no fan of Lord Kitchener, going on the attack. Asquith, convinced by the King that he could only save Kitchener’s role in the government by relieving him of his responsibility for munitions, acted. On the 9th of June, he created a new Ministry of Munitions with Lloyd George as its new minister. Lloyd George took control and shifted the emphasis from that which industry could supply to what the army needed, memorably saying that what was needed was to “Take Kitchener’s maximum, square it, multiply that by two; and when you are in sight of that double it again for good luck.” It helps if you read that bit in a Welsh accent.
This was hyperbole but signified the shift towards heavier and heavier bombardments with a greater supply of ammunition for each gun. Armaments were also shifted towards more heavy 18 pounder guns, as Lloyd George moved production away from field guns towards larger calibre weapons, with 1200% more heavy guns being produced. Lloyd George borrowed heavily from the French munitions model which had been placed on a war footing from the moment when the war broke out. He recruited men from industry to work in the new ministry, hiring managers who could respond to the need for greater production, including heavy industry, the City of London and Johnny Walker’s whisky distillery. A survey of munition facilities was carried out, a regional organisational structure was established, and direct contracts were placed. Over the longer term, national munitions factories were established and, despite rising prices, driven by demand, long-term contracts were offered to stimulate demand and develop greater capacity.
These changes pushed Britain’s munitions manufacturing capability in the right direction, but they were not a magic war-winning bullet as the British still had a lot of learning to do. To understand the impact of the shell crisis we need to ask ourselves whether greater amounts of munitions would have resulted in success at Aubers Ridge and whether this would have led to further successes, potentially shortening the war?
Let’s speculate a little…
For the Aubers Ridge attack itself, capture of the high ground along the ridge would have been a great success and would have placed the Allies in a better position from which it might have been easier to continue the attack. However, we can’t assume that a heavier, longer, bombardment would have resulted in this. The German defences were strong, with hidden dips of wire that were unobservable from the ground or the air. Also, the art of artillery fire was still far behind where it would be at the end of the year, so we have to assume that large amounts of the munitions wouldn’t have a clear effect. We have to assume that, if the attack had gone well, the Germans probably would have fallen back in good order, and would have counter-attacked successfully, as they were to do over and over again throughout the war. So, tactically, I don’t think we can assume that more shells would have been game-changing at this point of the war.
Now let’s consider the longer term. If supply capacity had been ramped up at the beginning of the war and reorganised to move onto a genuine war-footing, certain lessons that the British learnt during the course of the war would have been accelerated.
Firstly, if the army had more shells available, they certainly would have tried to use a greater, longer bombardment earlier, and therefore and would have discovered that they needed to shift to more heavy armaments earlier. Secondly, the way in which the shell crisis transformed from an issue with quantity in early 1915 to an issue of quality in 1916 would have been understood and resolved earlier. As production was expanded, using new techniques, new suppliers and new technologies, so the numbers of duds, early detonations and other issues began to manifest. These problems, caused by faulty, rushed manufacture of both munitions and artillery pieces, were probably inevitable during such a transformation, so, once again, it would have been advantageous to have encountered them earlier than happened in reality. Fundamentally, the 1915 shell crisis highlights the fact that Britain still hadn’t quite grasped the enormity of the material might that would be needed to prosecute the war and anything that could have accelerated this learning process would have been of benefit.
Finally, we can’t discount the fact that the British military were also on a learning curve. They thought they’d be able to break the German lines and re-enter the open-warfare phase that had been ended by the solidification of the front lines into defended trenches. When they found that this was difficult, it was hard for them to assume that their tactics were wrong, after all, they had nearly succeeded, right? Problems with shell supply was not only the reality, but was also convenient as it wasn’t attributable to the commanders in the field. If you start from a position that your general approach is right, then, when you meet with failure, the root cause must be something outside of your control. Therefore, we have to assume that they needed to get to the point where weight of shellfire had failed in order to explore new tactics that had a better chance of unlocking the front.
The shell crisis marked another turning point, alongside the early manpower crises, where political and military leaders in Britain needed to shift their perspective from “business as usual” to something new that required new methods. The shell crisis story helped the British leadership to take another important step along the pathway towards employing the state’s resources properly. As such Repington’s shell crisis story has to be seen as a fine example of journalism exposing a real problem with far-reaching consequences; and I guess that’s what any journalist would say that’s what they exist to do.
One news story
No news this week.
Sometimes there’s just no obvious story to write about and this is one of those weeks...
One from the archives
Letter from the Vickers armaments company in the Cabinet Office Papers
This week’s “one from the archives” is an excerpt from a letter sent to the Ministry of Munitions of War, and addressed to the minister in charge Christopher Addison, in response to a decision to extend the call up requirements, a measure that now included some munitions workers. The letter appears in the Cabinet Office Papers (cab-24-6) in support of a memo from Addison to the Cabinet, explaining the impact of the decision.
In his memo, Addison explains that, while he supports the need to supply men to the army, he’s concerned about the “danger of a serious fall in the output cf certain essential munitions under the present interpretation of the decisions…”because of the way that the new rules were being implemented. As an appendix to his memo, Addison includes a letter from the Vickers armaments company that includes the following excerpt.
It seems that, whilst exemptions were in place for workers in essential industries, the definition of those essential skills meant that a wider cross-section of men than anticipated were likely to fall within the scope of the rules. Addison has no objection to unskilled or semi-skilled men being called up, but states that the new rules appear to include, “skilled men between the ages of 18 and 23 years who are engaged in the production and manufacture of brass, copper, aluminium and ether important metals, tubes, sheet iron, wire, springs, bolts and nuts, chains, chemicals, aeroplanes, aeronautical woodwork, glass; also to men engaged in the manufacture of machinery and tools, guns, motor lorries and.in ether industries.”
The Vickers letter then goes on to outline the impacts on production should these men be called up.
The Director of Vickers Limited then goes on to play hardball by stating that “From the above you will gather that if the proposal to withdraw the men referred to. is put into effect, the results so far as output is concerned will be most disastrous and far-reaching, and we beg respectfully to notify the Department that all promises for delivery in connection with contracts which we have now in hand are unreservedly withdrawn.”
This memo and letter expose the difficult decisions needed to balance the production of munitions with that of manpower which resulted in local tribunals assessing many cases to try and come to decisions that balanced the needs of industry, families and the military during the war. Whilst government made decisions at the macros level, these cases often went down to individual cases where companies maintained that workers were essential, and the men themselves had to explain their personal circumstances in great detail, and a tribunal of magistrates, the clergy and other local grandees were forced to make decisions that could spell life or death for the men involved.
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